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Archaeologists, neuroscientists and philosophers all aim to shed light on the holistic and co-
constitutive role played by bodies and brains, objects and culture over the course of hominin 
cognitive evolution. Recent advances in neuroscience and brain imaging have enabled 
exploration of the foundation for tool using capacity in modern human brains. In tandem with 
this has been the development of cognitive archaeology, a perspective that seeks to uncover and 
engage with past ways of thought, as these can be inferred from surviving material remains. 
What I will suggest in this paper is that the phenomenological perspective can contribute to the 
methodological drive in cognitive archaeology. Phenomenology provides just the kind of access 
to consciousness and the mind required for an understanding of “ways of thought and action”, 
including past ways of thought and action, to emerge. I will argue that pragmatic meaning-
bestowing agency is operative throughout the Palaeolithic and I will suggest how empirical 
evidence can be understood in the terms suggested by phenomenological philosophers. 
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Archaeologists, neuroscientists and philosophers all aim to shed light on the 
holistic and co-constitutive role played by bodies, brains, objects and worlds 
throughout hominin cognitive evolution. Hominins include modern humans 
(Homo sapiens sapiens) and all of our fossil ancestors: hominins are hominids, as 
are the great apes (Coward and Gamble 2009, p. 64). Archaeology can, with an 
increasing precision, tell us where and when modern humans emerged: Africa 
between 100.000 and 200.000 years ago. The archaeological record itself began 2.5 
million years ago with the appearance of the first intentionally modified stone 
tools. 
The earliest archaeological sites are composed of assemblages of stone artefacts 
and fragments of animal bone that constitute the earliest (non-anatomical) 
evidence for human behaviour (Klein 2009, pp. 725-727). This is the Oldowan 
Industrial Complex. Oldowan tools display a complexity such that the ability to 
produce them is (probably) beyond that acquirable by living chimpanzees (Klein 
2009, p. 733).
Human brains and the technology produced by them have been co-evolving 
since at least this period in the Early Stone Age (ESA) (Stout et al. 2009). Thus, it is 
not unreasonable to suggest that understanding human cognitive evolution will 
involve coming to terms with, amongst other things, tool use by our hominin 
ancestors. 
A perspective that seeks to uncover and engage with past ways of thought as 
these can be inferred from surviving material remains and that is concerned with 
the development of the human mind has been evolving in archaeology since the 
early 1980s under the title cognitive archaeology (e.g. Mithen 1996; Renfrew 1983, 
1993, 1994, 2007, 2009; Scarre 2005; Marshack 1972a, 1972b; Wynn 1979, 1981). 
Most recently cognitive archaeology has begun to engage with methodological 
questions in order to ascertain how it is possible to “learn how the minds of 
ancient communities worked” together with the “manner in which that working 
shaped their actions” (Renfrew 2007, p. 108). What I want to suggest in this paper 
is that the phenomenological perspective can contribute to this methodological 
drive in cognitive archaeology: phenomenology provides just the kind of access to 
consciousness and the mind required for an understanding of ways of thought and 
action, including past ways of thought and action. The promise of phenomenology 
for cognitive (and experimental) archaeology is that phenomenological analysis 
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can disclose the workings of the mind; the structures of action and agency, of 
temporality and consciousness, that can then be used to extrapolate how such 
structures shaped the actions of members of past communities. 
Advances in cognitive neuroscience and brain imaging have enabled researchers 
to explore the foundations for tool-using capacity in both modern human and 
modern primate brains. Stout et al. (2009) have suggested on the basis of a recent 
(FDG-PET) study a thesis for the co-evolution of language and tool manufacture: 
they note that the neural “circuits supporting ESA toolmaking partially overlap 
with language circuits” and that this suggests that:
these behaviours (tool manufacture and linguistic behaviour) share a foundation 
in more general human capacities for complex, goal-directed action and are likely 
to have evolved in a mutually reinforcing way (Stout et2009, pp. 15-16. Brackets: my 
addition). 
Phenomenological thinkers attempt to elucidate our capacities for goal-directed 
activity within environments of pragmatic concern. Tool manufacture, for 
example, is guided by both pragmatic and social concerns and the action involved 
in producing these tools admits normative constraints. The use of equipment (e.g. 
a hammerstone) in the production of tools is structured intersubjectively: there 
are standards employed in getting this activity right (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, 
p. 154)1. 
Third-person experimental results relating to tool manufacture (or to any 
form of practical engagement) must be “correlated to [a] subjects first-person 
experience” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, p. 16) if they are to be informative 
for studies of consciousness. From a holistic perspective the attempt to 
comprehensively engage with and understand the human mind must at some 
point “confront consciousness and subjectivity” (Thompson 2007, p. 16). 
A dynamic shift between such perspectives when considering tool manufacture 
is prompted by at least two factors: i) the tools used in stone tool manufacture 
are highly personal (Stout et al). Test subjects were allowed to use their own 
hammerstones; ii) it is possible to discern traces of the styles of particular flint 
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1 Gallagher and Zahavi note that one difference between a piece of manufactured 
equipment and a naturally occurring object is that there are right and wrong ways to use 
manufactured equipment. In prehistoric contexts this division has to be augmented 
since naturally occurring objects (hammerstones, for example) were used as equipment 
without modifying them. Because of their deployment as equipment it follows that 
there were/are right and wrong ways to use such naturally occurring objects. 
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knappers in the archaeological record of ancient cites (Stringer 2006, p. 83). 
Did these ancient knappers also have personal equipment? The first person 
perspective and its traces is announcing itself as a field of study. Our only access 
to the physical world, whether in field work or in experimental settings, is 
made possible by consciousness (Gallagher 2007; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008). 
Consciousness is the sine qua non “access we have to studying the physical world” 
(Gallagher 2007). 
Phenomenological thinkers have suggested that it is possible to approach 
consciousness scientifically. Phenomenological approaches to consciousness 
will enable archaeologists to overcome the spectre of Cartesianism that has been 
affecting accounts of human cognitive evolution. Coward and Gamble suggest 
that human evolutionary studies remains “committed to a Cartesian model of 
cognition and consciousness” wherein cognition is “abstracted from its real-
world context” (Coward and Gamble 2009, p. 52). Since the advent of existential-
phenomenology such abstraction of consciousness and cognition from real 
world contexts has been anathema. Central to the work of phenomenological 
thinkers is their desire to reconnect agents with the world as they experience 
it. Phenomenology attempts to grasp and unfold the original meanings of 
agents’ direct experience of the world (Chaplin 2001, p. 159). Phenomenologists 
are motivated by the desire to look at the world afresh from a first-person 
perspective (Merleau-Ponty 1962) so as to try to articulate our pre-reflective 
lived experience of that world without becoming embroiled in Cartesian 
epistemological problems. 
Phenomenologists argue that subjectivity and objectivity are abstract notions that 
arise out of and are derivative from a far more basic, dynamic and complex unity 
named being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein). What is essential to the structure of 
any experience is its intentionality: the experience’s being about some object or 
other in the world. Phenomenological description will eventually lead from basic 
descriptions of objects to description of the basic dimensions of intentionality. 
Eventually, description will lead to an analysis of the conditions of possibility of 
our experiences. These conditions set-up our experiences into the forms that we 
experience them: phenomenology leads into an enquiry into the conditions of the 
possibility of intentionality, our bodily dealings with the world, our habits, our 
social and cultural practices, including our natural languages. 
Phenomenological thinkers maintain objectivity in their descriptions by 
implementing methodological innovations generating results available to 
intersubjective corroboration (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, pp. 19-28). Many 
subscribe to a naturalized phenomenology recognising that the phenomena 
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under study are part of the natural world and are also available to empirical 
and experimental investigation. Phenomenology ought to be informed by the 
most up-to-date science and science must be informed by phenomenological 
analysis: the result will be the best available account of subjective experience and 
its enabling conditions (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, p. 30). Phenomenology can 
contribute to cognitive archaeology by enabling the best account of past ways of 
thought and action to emerge.
How is a piece of stone constituted as a cutting tool by an agent? Introducing 
the notion of appropriative agency can help answer this. Appropriative agency 
involves appropriation of aspects of the (material) world to discrete tasks. For 
Heideggerian phenomenologists the world is revealed as a holistic totality of 
significance relations wherein the being of any thing is determined by its use or 
readiness-to-hand in relation to an agent. Being is the meaningful relatedness that 
things can have for an agent. 
Heidegger’s account of practical engagement (Dasein) shows how an agent’s 
purposeful appropriation of an item to the task of cutting, for example, 
constitutes that item as a piece of equipment. I suggest that such constituting 
behaviour (pragmatic meaning-bestowing appropriative agency) has been 
operative since the Palaeolithic: this is the phenomenological insight I want to 
bring to bear on problems in cognitive archaeology. 
Example: a hammerstone is an item of equipment used by an agent in their daily 
work of making tools. Enquiry into the being of a hammerstone will ask about 
the structures by virtue of which it is available to an agent as ready-to-hand. 
The structures in question include the hammerstones’ belonging to a context 
of equipment and to its referring to/pointing at other items to be appropriated, 
such as raw materials, into the agents’ project. For Heidegger, the category of 
equipment is a paradigm case of the available and “all equipment is what it is and 
the way it is only within a particular context” (Heidegger 1995, p. 215). 
Ready-to-hand items can become present-at-hand when they become objects 
of (quasi) scientific enquiry: the hammerstone shatters and the agents’ normal 
fluid practical engagement with their useful tool is interrupted. They encounter 
a difficulty and an unanticipated situation. The transition from ready-to-hand to 
present-at-hand transpires when the occurrentness of the object obtrudes and it 
presents itself as a discrete property bearing entity needing fixed. 
A piece of equipment is available when it is “defined in terms of its place in a 
context of equipment, typical activities in which it is used, and typical purposes 
or goals for which it is used” and when it “lends itself to such use readily and 
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easily, without need for reflection” (Dreyfus and Wrathall 2005, p. 4). The 
world and our acquaintance with it is the basis upon which the entities met 
in experience can be involved with one another and with us. Understanding 
(Verstehen) is the central dimension of agents’ being-in-the-world. Meaning 
is use: what a thing is, is what it is understood to be by an agent within a 
particular context/community. Might hominin engagement with the world be 
characterised by linguisticality? Could hominin linguistic behaviour (gesture and 
speech) and tool manufacture be grounded in basic yet complex intentional 
activity within pragmatic environments? 
In any case action-in-the-world reveals agents’ general understanding of how 
things relate to each other and to their possibilities. Action reveals to agents’ the 
general know-how inhabiting their understanding. This a matter of practical 
agency since understanding in Heidegger’s sense is manifest in agents’ projecting 
into possibilities for action that are afforded to agents’ by how things in general 
are related to each other as a meaningful whole (Dreyfus and Wrathall 2005, p. 6). 
Recently Gosden has emphasised the plasticity of brains and objects: “brains help 
make new objects, which in turn help create new brains” (Gosden 2009, 109). 
Plasticity is the ability of the brain to change as a result of experience (Ward 
2006, 177). From an archaeological/object-centerd perspective Gosden considers 
how novel materials appearing in the archaeological record at different times 
(stone, bronze, iron) placed new demands on the brains and bodies of agents who 
engaged with them. The realisation that there is a holistic and co-constitutive 
role played by bodies, brains, objects and worlds over the course of hominin 
cognitive evolution can now be taken as a starting point when considering the 
complex relationship between brains, bodies and worlds (Gosden 2009, p. 108). 
Embodied knowledge and bodily intelligence is the key to skilled productive 
activity and material objects can change and extend the body schemas of agents 
utilizing them. Gosden argues that our peripersonal space can be extended 
through objects: the creation of an object – his example is a sword – impacts 
on this sense of space and to the relationships between agents that is mediated 
materially by the object2. 
The world of metals aided the creation of different sets of social ontologies – 
networks of connections between agents and materials – than those created in 
the earlier world of stone (Gosden 2009, p. 116). In different periods peripersonal 
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2 Multiple agents might have been involved in the production of the sword in Gosden’s 
example. The understanding how to work the different materials involved in producing 
the sword was probably beyond the ken of a single individual (Gosden 2009, 115). 
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space and social interaction are constructed differently and such construction 
is fundamentally related to manufacturing objects (Gosden 2009, p. 116). The 
origination of such networks and relationships is available to phenomenological 
description by virtue of the disclosure integral to the creation of an artefact and 
phenomenology can aid the reconstruction of such disclosive events in the past. 
Phenomenological analysis opens up such creative moments and so can 
contribute to cognitive archaeology. While it is not possible to recreate the minds 
of past agents something of a fusion of horizons is possible. The phenomenologico-
hermeneutic recreation of networks of meaning in the past is possible and the 
phenomenological contribution to method in cognitive archaeology amounts 
to disclosing relations of in order to and for the sake of which that inhabited past 
agents’ understanding vis-à-vis their cultural know-how. Such know-how is the 
enabling power of the social ontology that agents creatively inhabit. 
The cognitive archaeophenomenologist is able to investigate the experience of 
tool manufacture on its own terms in order to give an account of the subjective 
experience of tool manufacture. Causal factors remain the province of cognitive 
science. Naturalised phenomenology will operate in terms of and will inform 
cognitive archaeology. 
The phenomenological perspective can contribute to cognitive archaeology 
because it reconnects researchers with the world as it is experienced by a 
practically engaged agent, whosoever that agent is or was. Looking at the world 
afresh from a first-person perspective in order to articulate pre-reflective lived 
experience is the basic starting point for coming to terms with human cognitive 
evolution. Cognitive archaeophenomenology does not proceed by asking 
about minds and brains as separable entities but by inquiring into the structures 
enabling the production of both agents and meaningful worlds. 
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